Abstract-Resilient control systems play a special role in the area of cyber-physical systems, where the design must address the question how complex dynamic plants are to be controlled safely and reliably when a control system is under a cyber attack. In this paper we describe a control theoretical framework based on the concept of passivity for designing a control network which can tolerate, for instance, denial-of-service attacks on networks used in the closed loop. In particular, we demonstrate how the resilient power junction structure could be applied, and provide simulated results.
I. INTRODUCTION
The design of resilient control systems necessitates novel developments at the intersection of computer science and control theory. The control of complex dynamic systems is a wellstudied area, but much less is known about how to implement such control systems that are able to tolerate shortcomings of non-ideal software and network-based implementation platforms. Additionally, not only implementation side-effects have to be mitigated, but also potential issues related to security of the control system. For instance, if a network used in the control loop is under a denial-of-service attack, we still need to maintain the quality of control for the plant. If the controller itself is compromised, we need to detach it from a plant and an alternative controller must be brought online. In this paper we describe a control-theoretical framework based on passivity principles. Passivity-based controllers are ideally suited for high-confidence control systems that have infinite gain margins, thus possess a great deal of robustness to uncertainty.
Passivity is a mathematical property of the controller implementation, and could be realized in different ways. The approach described here applies to a large family of physical systems which can be described by both linear and nonlinear system models [1] - [3] , including systems which can be described by cascades of passive systems such as quadrotor aircraft [4] . Furthermore, the theory can be applied to networked control design [5] , [6] including over wireless networks [7] .
For this paper we shall focus on the use of a structure called the resilient power junction ( a special type of power junction [8] , [9] ) to demonstrate how a passive physical system (in which its dynamics are described by ordinary differential equations) can be interconnected to multiple-redundant-passivedigital controllers while maintaining L discuss the conditions for the type of non-redundant controllers which can be tolerated if no detection scheme is used. In addition we demonstrate how potentially-destabilizing nonredundant controllers can be removed from the network when detection of the non-redundant controller occurs.
Section II-A reviews wave variables with which the power junction interacts with. Section II-B reviews the passive sampler and passive hold, which allow a continuous time plant to be interconnected to a digital control network. Section II-C introduces the resilient power junction (the main contribution to this paper). Section II-D provides the main stability result which shows that L m 2 -stability can be maintained in spite of non-redundant controllers being introduced to the network. Section III provides simulated results when various types of non-redundant controllers are connected to the network. Section IV provides conclusions for this paper.
II. RESILIENT CONTROL ARCHITECTURE Fig. 1 depicts a resilient digital control network which maintains L m 2 -stability, even when non-redundant controllers could be potentially introduced into the network. In particular, m redundant passive digital controllers (denoted G cj : f cj → e cj j ∈ {1, . . . , m}) and m c −m non-redundant digital controllers j ∈ {m + 1, . . . , m c } are interconnected to a resilient power junction (denoted by the symbol PJ ) in order to provide reliable control for a single continuous time plant (denoted G pn : e pn → f pn in which n = m c + 1). The resilient power junction can be operated in a manner in which it does not explicitly detect non-redundant controllers or it can operate in a more-restricted environment in which it enforces that only redundant controllers can modify the behavior of the plant. In the more-restrictive mode, non-redundant controllers shall be isolated from the network so as not to potentially destabilize the rest of the network. In regards to notation, we refer the reader to (15) , the final form of (15) , allows us to simplify numerous expressions which require either integrals or summations. More specifically y, u X represents the innerproduct between the two variables y, u, if X = N (X = N T s ) then the inner-product refers to the discrete-time (continuoustime) inner-product, in addition the respective squared twonorm u 
A. Wave Variables
Networks of a passive plant and controller are typically interconnected using power variables. Power variables, denoted by an effort and flow pair (e * ,f * ), product is power. They are typically used to show the exchange of energy between two systems using bond graphs [10] , [11] . However, when power variables are subject to delays the communication channel ceases to be passive which can lead to instabilities. Using a bilinear-transform, the power variables can be transformed into wave-variables [12] , [13] .
The wave variable u pn , described by (1), can be thought of as the sensor output for plant G pn . Analogously the wave variable v cj , described by (3), can be thought of as each actuator output for each controller G cj , j ∈ {1, . . . , m c }. The symbol i ∈ {0, 1, . . . } depicts discrete time for the controllers, and the symbol t ∈ R denotes continuous time and the two are related to the sample and hold time (T s ) such that t = iT s . (1) and (2) respectively satisfy the following equality:
Similarly, (3) and (4) respectively satisfy the following equality ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , m c }:
Denote I ∈ R ms×ms as the identity matrix. When implementing the wave variable transformation the continuous time plant "outputs" (u pn (t), e dcn (t)) are related to the corresponding "inputs" (v pn (t), f pn (t)) as follows ( Fig. 1) :
Next, the discrete time controller "outputs" (v cj (i), f dpj (i)) are related to the corresponding "inputs" (u cj (i), e cj (i)) as follows ( Fig. 1) :
The power junction indicated in Fig. 1 by the symbol PJ has waves entering and leaving the power junction as indicated by the arrows. Waves leaving the controllers v cj and entering the power junction v j in which j ∈ {1, . . . , m c } have the following relationship
in which p j (i) denotes the time delay in transmitting the control wave from 'controller-j' to the power junction. Next, the input wave to the plant v pn is a delayed version of the outgoing wave from the power junction v n such that
in which p n (i) denotes the discrete time delay in transmitting the outgoing wave to 'plant-n'. Fig. 1 depicts fixed time delays using the z-transform (i.e. z −pn ). Next, the outgoing wave from the plant u pn is related to the wave entering the power junction u n as follows:
in which c n (i) denotes the discrete time delay in transmitting the wave from 'plant-n' to the power junction. Last, the input wave to the controller u cj is a delayed version of the outgoing wave from the power junction u j , j ∈ {1, . . . , m c } such that
in which c j (i) denotes the discrete time delay in transmitting the wave from the power junction to 'controller-j' (the delays are denoted as z −c j in Fig. 1 ).
B. Passive Sampler and Passive Hold
In [14] it is shown how a passive sampler (PS) a passive hold (PH) in conjunction with a inner-product equivalent sampler (IPES) and zero-order-hold (ZOH) can be used to achieve a L m 2 -stable system consisting of (a) passive robot(s) and (a) digital controller(s). The PS and PH framework, unlike other data-reduction techniques used in telepresence systems [15] , does not require the user to take digital waves and convert them back to a continuous-time signal to be connected to a continuous-time controller. As can be seen in Fig. 1 we have connected the PS and PH to plant-n, while connecting the (IPES) and zero-order-hold (ZOH) block to each passive digital controller G cj , j ∈ {1, . . . , m} in order to relate r cj (i) to r cj (t) and e cj (i) to e cj (t) in a passivity preserving manner. Therefore we recall the following set of definitions:
Definition 1: The passive sampler denoted (PS n ) and the corresponding passive hold denoted (PH n ) must be implemented such that the following inequality is satisfied ∀N > 0:
One way to implement the PS and PH is to use the averaging passive sampler and hold. Definition 2:
The averaging passive sampler denoted (PS n ) and the corresponding averaging passive hold denoted (PH n ) is implemented such that for each l th component (l ∈ {1, . . . , m s }) of the discrete-time-sampled wave u pn (i) ∈ R ms (denoted u pn l (i)) is determined from the respective l th component of the continuous-time wave u pn (t) ∈ R ms (denoted u pn l (t)) using PS n as follows: (10) and the continuous-time wave v pn (t) ∈ R ms is determined from the discrete-time wave v pn (i) ∈ R ms in terms of each of their respective l th components using PH n as follows:
Using a PS and PH such as the averaging passive sampler and hold we can now relate continuous time variables to discrete time wave variables associated with plant G pn . Substituting (5) into (9) results in the following inequality for the plant
(12) If we assume that the networking time delays of the transmission and reception of the wave variables satisfy Proposition 1 (see Appendix A) then the following inequalities hold:
This leads us to the following corollary which relates (12) to the corresponding pair of waves entering and leaving the power junction (u n (i), v n (i)).
Corollary 1: The continuous time plant-n (flow f pn (t) and effort e dcn (t)) pair depicted in Fig. 1 is related to their respective pair of waves entering and leaving the power junction (u n (i), v n (i)) such that
is satisfied if the wave variable communication time-delays satisfy any of the conditions listed in Proposition 1. Since T s is typically not an integer, we will typically drop the i or t symbol and use N to refer to extended discretetime l m 2 norms and N T s to refer to extended L m 2 norms. In an analogous manner we can relate the control effort and flow variables (e cj (i), f dpj (i)) to the power junction wave variables (u j (i), v j (i)) ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , m c } for the m c -digital controllers.
Corollary 2: All m c discrete time controller (flows f dpj (i) and efforts e cj (i)) pairs depicted in Fig. 1 are related to their respective pair of waves leaving and entering the power junction
is satisfied if the wave variable communication time-delays satisfy any of the conditions listed in Proposition 1.
A properly implemented power junction will always satisfy the following inequality [8] :
Which leads us to the following lemma.
Lemma 1:
The m c discrete time controller (flows f dpj (i) and efforts e cj (i)) pairs j ∈ {1, . . . , m c } are related to the continuous time plant (flow f pn (t) and effort e dcn (t)) pair depicted in Fig. 1 
C. The Resilient Power Junction
The resilient power junction is a special type of power junction which satisfies the following: i) the general definition for the power junction [8, Definition 1], in particular inequality (17) is satisfied ii) may be implemented to detect non-redundant controllers during run-time, and isolate non-redundant controllers by simply setting u j−detect (i) = v j−detect (i) ∀ i ≥ N j−detect in which N j−detect indicates the point in time when controller-j − detect's v j−detect (i) = v 1 (i). In addition, the isolated non-redundant controllers will no longer add to the calculation of v n . For simplicity of discussion we consider two scenarios. Under the first scenario the resilient power junction is implemented under the assumption that all m c -controllers are redundant. The second scenario provides conditions for the resilient power junction to detect a non-redundant controller and isolate it from the network.
Assumption 1: i) there are m c − m non-redundant controllers with indexes j ∈ {m + 1, . . . , m c } and m ≥ 1 passive controllers with indexes j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, ii) at initial time i = 0, m is unknown and m c is known, iii) all power junction waves are vectors such that u n , v n , u j , v j ∈ R ms and the l th component (l ∈ {1, . . . , m s }) of each wave is denoted u n l , . . . , v j l respectively, iv) wave variable communication time-delays satisfy any of the conditions listed in Proposition 1. Assumption 2: i) Assumption 1 holds except all wavevariable communication time-delays and data-dropouts between the power junction and the controllers are identical, ii) the temporal order in which non-redundant controllers are detected will be such that
Definition 3: Given Assumption 1, the resilient power junction is implemented as follows: i) initialize: i = 0,m(i) = m c , ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} E j (i) = 0 ii) computeû 1 (i),û
iii) N = i + 1, compute ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
vii) letm =m(N ) compute u 1 (i) using the right hand side of (19) and ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m(N )} set u j (i) = u 1 (i), and compute
viii) setm =m(N ) and compute v n (i) by using the resilient power junction equation (20)
The resilient power junction has the following properties: i) it satisfies [8, Definition 1] for the power junction as a result:
ii) in addition, when Assumption 2 holds and after the final non-redundant controller has been detected at time N (m+1)−detect and the corresponding finite-energy offset which will remain constant for all ∀ N ≥ N (m+1)−detect is assumed to equal zero, then (21) holds.
2 stability of our digital control network depicted in Fig. 1 we need to relate ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , m} the discrete-time reference and effort variables associated with each passive digital controller G cj (denoted by the respective tuple (r cj (i), e cj (i))) to a continuous-time reference and effort variable counterpart which we denote by the respective tuple (r cj (t), e cj (t)). In order to make this comparison we used the inner-product equivalent sampler (denoted IPES j in Fig. 1 ) and a zero-order-hold (denoted ZOH j in Fig. 1 ). We will refer to the pair of these devices as the inner-product equivalent sample and hold (IPESH).
Definition 4: [14] , [16] The m-inner-product equivalent sample and hold's depicted in Fig. 1 by the pair of respective symbols (IPES j ,ZOH j ) j ∈ {1, . . . , m} in which the inputs are denoted by the pair (r cj (t), e cHj (i)) and the outputs are denoted by the pair (r cSj (i), e cj (t)). The inner-product equivalent sampler (IPES) is implemented by sampling r cj (t) at a rate (T s ) such that ∀N > 0:
The ZOH is implemented as follows:
Corollary 3: Using the IPESH (Definition 4) we have that e cj , r cj N Ts = e cHj , r cSj N holds.
In addition, using the ZOH results in
Finally Fig. 1 possesses some scalar scaling gains k s ∈ R + to account for the using the power-junction, PS and PH and the IPESH, such that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m}:
Applying Corollary 3, (26), and (27) results in e cj , r cj N = e cHj , r cSj N = e cj , r cj N Ts (28)
Theorem 1: For the network controlled system depicted in Fig. 1 , the resilient power junction (Definition 3) is used and Assumption 1 is satisfied, then the combined system in regards to the plant G pn , and redundant and non-redundant controllers G cj ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , m c }:
I. is L m 2 -stable if the plant G pn (e pn (t)) and all controllers G cj ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , m c } are strictly-output passive. II. passive if the plant G pn (e pn (t)) and all controllers G cj ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , m c } are passive. The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix A-A2. From Lemma 2 (21) is satisfied, therefore from Theorem 1 we can state the following corollary.
Corollary 4:
For the network controlled system depicted in Fig. 1 , the resilient power junction (Definition 3) is used and Assumption 2 is satisfied, then for N ≥ N (m+1)−detect the combined system in regards to the passive plant G pn , and the remaining m passive controllers G cj ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , m} is: I. L m 2 -stable if the plant G pn (e pn (t)) and all passive controllers G cj ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , m} are strictly-output passive. II. passive if the plant G pn (e pn (t)) is passive.
III. SIMULATIONS
In this section we shall control a single strictly-output passive continuous time plant with 3 strictly-output passive 'PID'-digital controllers, and 1 system destabilizing-digital controller if it is not properly detected and isolated. The plant is described by the following equation:
The strictly-output passive 'PID'-digital controllers are of the following form:
in which k P > 0 is the proportional term, G I (z) is the 'integral' term which is synthesized by applying the IPESHtransform [9, Definition 4] to the following continuous-time 'integrator' model (N.B. this is an integrator with finite-gain, such as seen when using a lag-compensator, in which ǫ > 0 can be arbitrarily small in order to satisfy our strictly-output passive condition on the controller)
Similarly, G D (z) is the 'derivative' term which is synthesized by applying the IPESH-transform to the following continuoustime 'derivative' model
Note that N > 1, is typically chosen to be around 10. With our nominal plant given, we use the following loop-shaping formulas to select the control gains in terms of the nyquist frequency ω nyquist = π Ts .
Other relevant parameters to the simulation are b = 2, T s = .1, α = 1, ǫ = .001, N = 10. The unstable controller consisted of the discrete-time version of the negative 'PID'-digital controller with the integrator replaced with three-integrators. Fig. 2 shows the nominal system response when all controllers are redundant, as we can see, the controller is able to reject periodic step-like disturbances. Fig. 3 shows the effect when one of the controllers is corrupted in a passive manner and looses its integrator-term, when controllers loose the proportional-term the overall degradation in performance is barely noticeable. Fig. 4 shows that intermittent denial-ofservice attacks lead to a graceful degradation and recovery of performance as a single controller is being attacked on the network. We should note that the denial of service attack can also be thought of as a single controller setting its integral, proportional term and derivative term to zero. Fig. 5 shows that in a very short period of time, the introduction of the destabilizing controller with non-redundant-controllerdetection disabled, system instability will occur. Fig 6 indi- cates that when non-redundant-controller-detection is enabled the destabilizing-controller is isolated from the rest of the network and not only is stability preserved, but disturbances from r pn (t) are still eliminated.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have described how a general technique: passivity, and a particular controller structure involving the resilient power junction can be used. The resilient power junction operating under Assumption 1 when interconnected to m c −redundant controllers and a single plant will always perform well under both denial-of-service attacks on individual controllers and degrade gracefully as additional strictly-output passive 'corrupted' digital controllers are introduced into the network. However, when introducing a highly-unstable controller into the network great care must be taken in order to identify and isolate the digital controller. Assumption 1 had to be made quite a bit-stricter in order to isolate these unstable controllers, in particular the time-delays and datadropouts needed to be identical when transmitting controller wave variables to and from the power-junction. This can be fairly easily satisfied on a real-time-operating system but more difficult over a network. We did provide the important result, however, that controllers can be removed without either destabilizing the system and showed that they can still maintain uninterrupted performance.
The theoretical framework presented gives a tool to the control engineer for building digital control systems that can survive, and even 'operate through' attacks, while maintaining the quality of control. Naturally, there are critical points in the implementation (e.g. the realization of the resilient power junction) that needs to be created with great care. In any case, passivity-based approaches to controller design provide a promising direction for designing controllers that are significantly more robust than other techniques. As illustrated, mathematical proofs exist for their properties, and they could be widely applied to linear and non-linear systems alike.
